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The purpose of our research is to provide empirical evidence of what and how participation in budgeting 
relates to the creation of budgetary slack conducted by managers through autonomous budget motivation. This 
research is expected to contribute to research and practice in the field of management accounting. Hypothetical testing 
is done empirically by collecting data through questionnaire dissemination surveys in various companies located in 
East Java. Data testing is performed with the help of the SmartPLS 3.0 app. The results of the data analysis showed 
that increased participation in budget preparation by managers from various departments led to a decrease in the 
creation of budgetary slack by managers. Nevertheless, the data test results were unable to prove that autonomous 
budget motivation was able to act as a mediation variable in the relationship between budget participation and 
budgetary slack. The results of the study indicate that only by actively participating in the budget preparation process, 
can directly reduce the tendency of employees to create budgetary slack without waiting for the high motivation of 
autonomous budgets that employees have first. 
 









Siegel & Marconi (1989) describes the budget as having a direct impact on individual 
behavior, especially for individuals who participated in the process of drafting a budget. This is 
what underlies the number of research accounting behavior related to budgeting that is still very 
relevant to be researched even today and experiencing rapid growth. The model that is often 
researched is the empirical testing of the influence of budget participation on budgetary slack 
behavior (Suhartini, Riadi, & Sari, 2015). Budgeting research is still very relevant to be researched 
because budgeting is one of the most important things for planning, coordination, and 
organizational control. The manager requires an estimate of reliable future conditions to create 
effective budgeting (Nouri & Parker, 1996). Budgeting is a detailed planning process for the use 
of resources for a certain period, both for acquisition, financial capital use, etc. Budgeting contains 
financial aspects and non-financial aspects of a planned project and operations since budgeting is 
a communication tool for top management with employees (Blocher, Stouth, & Cokins, 2010).  
A budgetary slack phenomenon is one of the topics that has gained much attention from 
researchers and is most examined in management accounting from year to year even the last few 
years (Chong, 2011 and Chen, Lu, Chang, & Liu, 2016). Onsi (1973) presented his research results 
explaining that there was a negative relationship between the participation and the tendency of the 
manager to create slack, he added that the outcome of participation caused the manager to be less 
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interested in creating a slack. Not only does it show that participation plays an important role in 
reducing the budgetary slack, but Onsi (1973) also concluded participation promoted the attitude 
that the budget is not a game or accounting tool, so making the manager feel not under pressure to 
create slack. The results of Onsi Research (1973) are supported by the results of Merchant 
Research (1985)  which suggests that the manager's tendency to create a slack is low when the 
manager actively participates in budgeting. The findings of Dunk (1993) also show that reduced 
slack is a result of participation. Pamungkas et.al., (2014), Tresnayani and Gayatri (2016), 
Permana, et.al., (2017) also found that budget participation harmed budgetary slack. 
Unlike the previous research results (Dunk, 1993; Merchant, 1985; Onsi, 1973) stating that 
the budget participation negatively affects the budgetary slack, the study of budget participation 
in the budget preparation process conducted by Young (1985) succeeded in finding, that if the 
subordinates participated in the budget preparation process will cause budgetary slack, in which 
case the budget participation positively affects the budgetary slack. Nouri & Parker (1996) shows 
the research results that budget participation affects budgetary slack. The latest Panelitian carried 
out by Baerdemaeker & Bruggeman (2015) finds results if participation in strategy drafting has no 
direct association with the creation of a budgetary slack by the manager. Chong  (2011) found if it 
was created a budgetary slack, in which the budget participation was influenced by subordinate 
belief to the employer. The lower the subordinate's belief in the employer in budget participation, 
the tendency to create budgetary slack will be higher. Unlike if the subordinates have a firm belief 
in the superiors, the tendency to create a budgetary slack in the activity of budget participation will 
be smaller. This is because the subordinates do not hesitate to provide relevant and more reliable 
information in the process of drafting the budgetary slack. 
Pertiwi and Mahardhika (2019), Basyir (2017), Erina and Suartana (2016), Huseno (2017), 
Khasanah and Kristanti (2020), Rinaldi, et.al. (2020) found that budget participation had a positive 
effect on budget cuts. This means that budget cuts occur because the parties involved in budgeting 
provide biased information by reporting higher costs and lower revenues for budget targets to be 
reached. According to Basyir (2017), budget participation provides an opportunity for subordinates 
to do budgetary slack because subordinates are authorized in setting the contents of the budget and 
assessed based on the performance of the budget. According to Law 2310 No. 17 of 2003, the 
definition of performance-based budget is an approach in the preparation of a budget based on 
performance or achievement of work that wants to be achieved. The assessment sparked budgetary 
slack, as subordinates had more clear and accurate information that led to the asymmetry of 
information on the boss. The delivery of information from subordinates can not be conveyed 
properly to the superior. So, the more budgetary or subordinate the greater the opportunity to do 
budgetary slack due to information asymmetry. 
In addition to the results of research conducted by Putra and Mintoyuwono (2019) and 
Bharata, et.al., (2020). They found that budget participation had no significant effect on budget 
cuts. This means that the high or low participation of the budget has no effect on the rise or fall of 
the budget or does not affect the budget. The results of the description that have been done indicate 
the inconsistency of previous research results. It indicates that other variables can affect the 
relationship between budget participation and budgetary slack. As a result of the statement 
Govindarajan (1986), that the difference in research results is influenced by variable contingencies 
so that it can be solved using a contingency approach, which is by adding other variables that may 
affect the relationship between budget participation and budgetary slack. An autonomous budget 
motivation is another variable of contingency that researchers use as mediation variables from 
budget participation and budgetary slack. The motivation of an autonomous budget is 
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characterized by a feeling of freedom and underlying will. There is quite a lot of research in 
psychology regarding the motivation of autonomous budgets providing evidence of positive 
results. Unlike the controlled motivation characterized by a wide range of pressures, and many 
studies give a lot of negative results (Baerdemaeker & Research, 2015).    
According to Self-Determination Theory (SDT), the motivation of the autonomous budget 
can be cultivated through an environment that supports the needs and sustains three basic 
psychological needs inherent in all human beings, namely: 1) The need for Autonomy, 2) the need 
for competence, and 3) the need for interconnectedness (Baedemaeker et al., 2015). Employees 
who participated in the process of drafting the budget indirectly will fulfill all three basic needs of 
the employee's psychology and will give positive influence and increase the effectiveness in the 
process of drafting the budget to the achievement stage of the budget. This will motivate employees 
not to create budgetary slack in the process of drafting a budget. As a result of the research, 
Baerdemaeker & Bruggeman (2015) Explain that budget participation does not directly affect the 
creation of budgetary slack, but budget participation does not directly influence the budgetary 
slack through the motivation of autonomous budget. According to Yuliastuti & Prabowo (2015), 
high motivation has a significant negative effect on the relationship between the preparation of the 
budget with the budgetary slack, the higher the motivation in the individual involved in the process 
of drafting the budget can decrease the budgetary slack. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Agency theory 
Agency theory is used to identify the role of budget participation in creating dysfunctional 
behavior in the form of budget cuts. In this study, the agency's theory aims to explain the 
relationship between superiors and subordinates in the process of budgeting, especially when 
subordinates target budgets. The practice of budget cuts in the perspective of agency theory is 
influenced by the agency's conflict of interest with the principal that arises when each party strives 
to achieve or maintain the desired level of prosperity. The agent has more financial information 
than the principal, while the principal utilizes personal interests. If the agent participating in the 
budgeting process has specific information about local conditions, the agent can provide the 
information that is owned to help the interests of the company, but in this case, often the principal 
desire is not the same as the agent to create a conflict. The research results of Dunk (1993), 
Merchant (1985), and Onsi (1973) showed that negative budget participation in budgetary slack. 
That is, participation in budgeting is shown to reduce budgetary slack. This may be because 
subordinates will provide personal information about prospects, thereby enhancing the accuracy 
of the formulated budget. The positive communication between superiors and subordinates can 
reduce the motivation of subordinates to create a budgetary slack (Meredith & Mantel, 2017). In 
contrast to the results of the study conducted by Young (1985) who found the reverse results. 
Young reveals that budget participation has a positive relationship to budgetary slack. The higher 
the level of participation in the budget preparation process, the possibility to create a budgetary 
slack will also be higher. 
  
Budget participation 
According to Mowen et al. (2014), The budget is a future financial plan that identifies the 
purpose and sleep that needs to be done so that the plan can be achieved. Participatory budgeting 
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is a budgeting system that allows managers to participate in and be responsible for the budget 
preparation process. The participatory budgeting system is one of the budgeting systems that can 
be used as a good communication tool for superiors and subordinates. Based on the explanation of 
the budget participation expressed by some researchers, it can be concluded that budget 
participation is a budget system that allows the lower-level manager or functional manager to 
participate in the process of making budget targets and be responsible for achieving the target 
budget. 
 
Budgetary Slack  
Govindarajan & Anthony (2007) stated that the budgetary slack is the difference between 
the amount of the budget recommended or submitted by the subordinate with the amount of the 
optimal estimate of the company. The same is also reinforced by the statement of Kilfoyle & 
Richardson (2010) which defines the budgetary slack as the difference between the budgeted 
resources and the resources needed to streamline the organizational achievement of the objectives. 
Other opinions are also expressed by Hobson et al. (2011) Explaining that the budgetary slack is 
created when subordinates shrink their skills or the ability of their business units in the budget they 
make. 
 
Autonomous budget motivation 
Based on self – determination theory, motivation will be differentiated into two sides. On 
the one hand, the motivation is divided into intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation. On the 
other hand, motivation is divided into Autonomous motivation (autonomous motivation), and 
controlled motivation (controlled motivation). Autonomous has the meaning of supporting one's 
actions at the highest level of reflection. Autonomous motivation is characterized by a feeling of 
being able to choose and thus behave in a self-determined manner. In other words, the person who 
acted considers the locus causality of this activity or himself as internal to him. Intrinsic motivation 
is an example of autonomous motivation. When people do activities because they feel attracted, 
they do the activity wholeheartedly. In contrast, controlled motivation involves action due to 
pressure, a feeling of being involved in the action. Autonomous motivation and controlled 
motivation (controlled motivation) are both intensive, and together they are contrary to the armory, 
involving lack of intent and motivation (Gagné & Deci, 2005). 
 
Budget participation and budgetary slack 
The participation of the budget is birth by involving the entire party, both management up 
to the functional manager so as not to happen information monopoly. Because budget participation 
leads to positive communication because of an information exchange mechanism, the exchange of 
information and decision making together will reduce the bias of existing budget information, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of budgetary slack. Govindarajan & Anthony (2007) show that the 
drafting of budget participation is an effective information exchange activity because managers in 
charge of the center of responsibility are most likely to have the best information about post income 
and costs. Atkinson et al. (2012) show that the method of participation offers additional benefits 
for management because the bottom manager discloses their personal information, disclosing data 
about how well they can do the work or allowing the introduction of new ideas that can help 
improve existing processes. Blocher et al. (2010) stated that participatory budgeting is increasing 
the employee's commitment to achieving a budget goal. 
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Onsi (1973) presented his research results explaining that there was a negative relationship 
between the participation and the tendency of the manager to create slack, he added that the 
outcome of participation caused the manager to be less interested in creating a slack. The results 
of Onsi Research (1973) are supported by the results of Merchant Research (1985) which suggests 
that the manager's tendency to create a budgetary slack is low when the manager actively 
participates in budgeting. The findings of Dunk (1993) also show that reduced slack is a result of 
participation. Pamungkas et.al., (2014), Tresnayani and Gayatri (2016), Tegar, et.al., (2017) also 
found that budget participation harmed budgetary slack. Based on the explanation, the hypotheses 
proposed are: 
H1: Budget participation negatively affects budgetary slack 
 
Autonomous Budgets Motivation To Promote The Influence Of Budget Participation On 
Budgetary Slack 
Autonomous motivation (autonomous motivation) can form when three basic needs of 
psychology related to individual motivation have been fulfilled, namely the need for autonomy 
(autonomy), competence (competence), and bonding (relatedness). The functional manager 
allowed to participate in the budget drafting process will feel that their basic needs have been met, 
and this can foster an autonomous motivation to the manager in terms of budgets. Budget 
participation is believed to be able to provide a positive impact on employee motivation to increase 
the quantity and quality of production and cooperation between managers (Djalil & Indriani, 
2017). Baerdemaeker & Bruggeman (2015) Displays the results of his research, which mentions 
that the increasing level of participation in strategic planning will increase the motivation of the 
autonomous budget motivation managers. The process of drafting a budget is one form of 
corporate strategy planning, and the participation of employees in the budget preparation process 
indicates the increased motivation of the employees ' autonomous budget. 
Wong-On-Wing et al., (2010) describe a strong connection between autonomous motivation 
and positive work, such as performance, creativity, diligence, and initiative. Baerdemaeker & 
Bruggeman (2015) also found negative influences from autonomous motivation to the creation of 
budgetary slack. This implies that managers who are autonomously driven (have autonomous 
motivation) will make greater efforts in finding solutions to achieve a target budget, and tend not 
to create a target budget that is more easily achieved (not creating a budgetary slack). 
Budget participation can degrade the budgetary slack indirectly through the mediation role 
of the autonomous budget motivation (Baerdemaeker & Research, 2015). When employees 
participate in a budget drafting process, this will motivate employees to increase their business in 
achieving a shared budget target that will lower the budgetary slack level.  Positive motivation has 
a negative impact on the relationship between budget participation and budgetary slack. Indicating 
a high of the positive motivation of the manager in the budget, the lower the creation of the 
budgetary slack. Based on the explanation, the hypotheses proposed are: 





This research is a type of exportation research aimed at explaining the influence of budget 
participation on budgetary slack by incorporating the effect of mediation of the motivation of 
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autonomous budgets with analytical units is individual. The individual is a functional manager, 
supervisor, head of a section, and also staff who are involved and in charge of drafting the budget 
on medium and large scale companies in East Java. Both companies are focused on the service 
sector, trade, and manufacturing.  
The data type in this research is the primary data, which is directly obtained from the data 
source of the respondent. The data collection process is carried out in 2018. The data source or 
respondent in this study are employees involved in the process of drafting the budget up to the 
decision making budget target, both functional manager, supervisor, head of a section, as well as 
staff. 
Variable budget participation is measured using a measurement instrument developed by 
Milani (1975) consisting of six indicators with a measurement scale using a Likert point scale of 
1 – 7. The variable budget is measured using a measurement instrument developed by Duke (1993) 
consisting of six indicators with a measurement scale using a Likert point scale of 1 – 7 points. 
And the variable motivation of autonomous budgets is measured by assessing individual prestige 
against budget participation using measurement instruments developed by Wong-On-Wing (2010) 
with a total of seven question indicators measured using a Likert point scale of 1 – 7. 
The first step in conducting data analysis is to conduct a data quality test obtained, namely 
by conducting a validity test and data reliability test to know the appropriateness of each indicator 
of the question to be used as a tool to measure the research variable by using SPSS version 22. 
After the data quality test, the next step is to do model analysis and hypothesis testing. Data 
analysis techniques in this study used structural equation modeling-partial at least square with the 
help of SmartPLS software version 3.0. This study uses the SEM-PLS model because in this study 
the variables used are latent variables (unobservable variables), i.e. autonomous budget motivation 
variables as mediation variables, budget participation variables as independent variables, and 
budget twilight variables as dependent variables, all of which are constructed using indicators as 
measurements. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Based on the analysis results, the description can be known from this table about the position 
of respondents at the time of completing the questionnaire 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistic 
Position Length of  
Work 




< 1 year 
4 (5,4 %) 






















- - - - - 
Supervisor 
10 (13,5%) 
7 – 9 years old  
3 (4,1%) 
- - - - - - 
Staff 
41 (55,4%) 
≥ 10 years old  
21 (21%) 
- - - - - - 
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Respondents who served as Vice president were 3 people (3.7%), the respondent who 
served as the CEO was 1 person (1.2%), the respondent who served as functional manager there 
were 10 people (13.5%), the respondent who served as supervisor of 10 people (13.65%), the 
respondent who served as employee staff there were 41 people (55.4%), and the respondent who 
served as other staff there were 9 people (12.2%). For the old category of working 21 respondents 
(28.4%) has been working for the company for more than ten years, 3 (4.1%) Respondents have 
been working for the company for 7-9 years, 15 (20.3%) Respondents have been working for the 
company for 4-6 years, 31 (41.9%) Respondents have been working for the company for 1-3 years, 
and 4 (5.4%) Respondents have been working for the company for less than one year. Based on 
the category of participation in the budget preparation process can be known that the entire 
respondent participated in the process of drafting the budget, so it is expected that the data to be 
processed can then be valid and reliable. For the category of involvement in budget preparation 
based on table 1, it is known that from 74 respondents, several 58 respondents (78.4%) Involved 
in the budget preparation process, while several 16 respondents (21.6%) Not involved in the budget 
drafting process. And lastly is for the category of authorities determining the budget can be noted 
that the majority of respondents stated that determining the budget is the employer of 64 
respondents (86.4%), while the remaining ten respondents (13.6%) Answer them that determines 
the budget amount. 
 
Validity Test and Reliability Test 
Discriminant validity is measured by comparing the square root value of each construct 
Variance Extracted (AVE) square root with the correlation between other constructs in the model. 
The AVE value must be greater than 0.30 or have a p-value smaller than the significance level 
(0.05). The results of the discriminant validity measurement in this study can be seen in this table: 
 
Tabel 2. Discriminant validity measurement results 
Variable Original Sample (O) 
Budgetary Slack 0,870 
Budget Participation 0,823 
Autonomous Budget Motivation 0,804 
 
Based on that table, all variables have a discriminant validity value above 0.50. From these 
results, it can be concluded that all variables are valid and can provide confidence. Once the 
variable has been declared valid, the realization test of all variables used in this study is carried 
out. Variable reliability is tested using composite reliability techniques. To determine whether or 
not a measuring instrument is performed through a reliability coefficient. The coefficient of 
reliability should be greater than 0.70. The results of the composite reliability measurement can be 
seen in the table below. 
 
Tabel 3. Composite Reliability measurement results 
Variable Original Sample (O) 
Budgetary Slack 0,862 
Budget Participation 0,918 
Autonomous Budget Motivation 0,940 
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Based on that table, all variables have a composite reliability value greater than 0.70. From 
these results, it can be concluded that all the variables in the study are reliable and reliable for use 
in further analysis tests. 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
The measuring model or outer model is evaluated using the validity and linear validity of 
the indicator and the composite reliability for the indicators block, as for structural models or inner 
models evaluated by looking at the value of R2 for the dependent latent construct using the size of 
Stone-Geisser Q Square-Test. Because this research uses a multidimensional construct, the second-




Figure 1. Conceptual Model Confirmatori Final Stage indicator 
 
Based on the information already presented in the table above, the following are the results 
of the analysis done to test the outer model: The autonomous budget motivation variable indicates 
the overall indicator has an outer loading factor value above 0.6, with a T-Statistic value greater 
than 1.99. MO1 with an outer loading factor of 0702 and a T-Statistic value of 5,466, MO2 with 
an outer loading factor of 0871 and a T-Statistic value of 6,430, MO3 with an outer loading factor 
of 0871 and a T-Statistic value of 4,835, MO4 with an outer loading factor of 0868 and a T-Statistic 
value of 4,729, MO5 with an outer loading factor of 0918 and a T-Statistic value of 5,187, MO6 
with an outer loading factor of 0888 and a T-Statistic value of 4,779, and MO7 with an outer 
loading factor of 0867 and a T-Statistic value of 5,635. 
The budget participation variable shows the overall indicator has an outer loading factor 
value above 0.7, with a T-Statistic value greater than 1.99. PA1 with an outer loading factor of 
0841 and a T-Statistic value of 7,464, PA3 with an outer loading factor of 0761 and a T-Statistic 
value of 6,047, PA4 with an outer loading factor of 0822 and a T-Statistic value of 6,746, PA5 
with an outer loading factor of 0913 and a T-Statistic value of 11,032, and PA6 with an outer 
loading factor of 0855 and a T-Statistic value of 9,230. 
The budgetary slack variable based on the results of the analysis in the table above indicates 
that the SA1 and SA3 indicators meet the criteria for having an outer loading factor greater than 
0.7 with a T-Statistic value greater than 1.99, which is SA1 with an outer loading factor of 0884 
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and a T-Statistic value of 11,908 and SA3 with an outer loading factor of 0850 and a T-statistic 
value of Based on the results above, it can be concluded that the measurements for the entire 
variable of this study meet convergent validity. 
 











Indicator Loading Factor T- Statistics s     
MO1 0702 5.466 
> 0.6 Good 
MO2 0871 6,430 
MO3 0871 4,835 
MO4 0868 4,729 
MO5 0.918 5,187 
MO6 0888 4,779 
MO7 0867 5635 
PA1 0841 7,464 
> 0.6 Good 
PA3 0.761 6,047 
PA4 0822 6,746 
PA5 0.913 11,032 
PA6 0.855 9,230 
SA1 0.884 11,908 
> 0.6 Good 




Variable Composite reliability 






Variable Average variance extracted (AVE) 






AVE Root Square > Correlation Between Latent 
Variable MAO PA SA   
Good 
MAO 0857     Higher 
PA 0.188 0840   Higher 
SA -0.430 -0.312 0867 Higher 
Inner model 
R-Square 
Variable  Rule of thumb 




≥ 0.25 Not good 
SA 0.290 
Full Coll VIF 
MAO 1,011 




> 0 Relevant 
SA 0.681 
Source: Processed data 
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Average Variance Extracted (AVE) 
Based on the table of analysis results Confirmation of measurement instrument above can 
be known that the AVE quadratic root value of the autonomous budget motivation variable (0368), 
Budget participation variables (0073) and budgetary slack (-0420) variables. The value of the AVE 
quadratic roots of the autonomic budget (0857) variable is higher than the correlation value of the 
budget participation variables (0188) and the value of the variable correlation budgetary slack (-
0430). The value of the quadratic root of the AVE variable participation budget (0840) is higher 
than the variable correlation value of the budgetary slack (-0312), and the value of the quadratic 
root of the AVE variable participation budget is 0867. Based on the resulting value can be 
concluded that each of the research construction has a good value linear validity.  
 
Composite Reliability 
Based on the table above, it can be known that the result of composite reliability is 
satisfactory because the value above 0.7, so it can be concluded that the entire block of items is 
indeed a gauge of its construction. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis testing results by comparing the T-count value to the T-table value. If the T-
count value is greater than T-table, then the relationship between variables is said to be significant 
and can be analyzed further. With the amount of data 74, the T-table value (α = 5%) of 1.99 and 
T-table value (α = 10%) of 1.67. Hypothesis testing results are presented in table below: 

























-0.228 1.217 Not 
Significant 
* Significant at a level of 5%, T-table value at level 5% = 1.99 
 
According to table above, it can be noted that: Budget participation (PA) has a significant 
negative influence on the budgetary slack (SA) with a CR value of T-count > T-table (2,219 > 
1,996) and a coefficient of path of-0298, this coefficient indicates that with the higher level of 
participation in budget preparation process can lower the tendency to create budgetary slack 
Budget participation has a negative and insignificant influence on a budget (SA), through 
autonomous budget motivation (MAO) mediation with a CR value of T-count < T-table (1,217 < 
1,668) and a coefficient of path of-0228, this coefficient indicates that with the higher level of 
budget participation can lower the trend of the creation of budgetary slack, because of the 
increasing the motivation of the autonomous  
 
DISCUSSION 
The Influence Of Budget Participation On Budgetary slack 
Hypothesis 1 states that negative budget participation affects budgetary slack. The results 
of the study using statistical tests showed a significant negative budget participation variable on 
the budgetary slack, resulting in hypotheses 1 acceptable (H1 accepted). The negative influence of 
budget participation on budgetary slack means the higher the participation rate in the process of 
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drafting the company budget, the lower the budgetary slack level is created. Budget participation 
should be done actively by all layers of the company members, starting from the very bottom staff 
who actually know the real condition of the company's operational activities because they are 
directly plunging in it, supervisor, head of a section, functional manager, budget board to top 
management.   
The high level of involvement of all employees in the budget preparation process will 
encourage every employee to express and give their opinion either willingly or when asked by the 
employer to give an opinion. This is what will make the employees feel very appreciated by the 
company because it is given the opportunity to participate and contribute to developing the 
company's final budget. By instilling feelings of belonging and upholding togetherness in 
expressing an opinion to formulate a company's budget, it will make employees more likely to 
express all the information that belongs to the budget in accordance with the capabilities. The more 
information about the budget value that approaches the standard and the normal capacity that 
should be achieved, the lower the creation of more and fewer budget differences. The creation of 
budgetary slack in the budget preparation process can also be suppressed because the absorption 
of all information relating to the budget value can occur well.   
Agency problems that often arise in the process of budgeting are due to the inability of a 
functional manager to absorb information obtained from employee staff related to how much real 
budget is needed so that the budgeted value really approaches even according to operational needs 
occurring within the company. This is called the information gap, which is the gap arising from 
the person planning the budget (functional manager, budget board and top manager) with the 
person executing (employee staff). 
Atkinson et al. (2012) show that the method of participation offers additional benefits for 
management because the bottom manager discloses their personal information, disclosing data 
about how well they can do the work or allowing the introduction of new ideas that can help 
improve existing processes. Blocher et al. (2010) stated that participatory budgeting is increasing 
the employee's commitment to achieving a budget goal. Onsi (1973) presented his research results 
explaining that there was a negative relationship between the participation and the tendency of the 
manager to create a slack, he added that the outcome of participation caused the manager to be less 
interested in creating a slack. The results of Onsi Research (1973) are supported by the results of 
the Merchant Research (1985) which suggests that the manager's tendency to create a slack is low 
when the manager actively participates in budgeting. The findings of Dunk (1993) also show that 
reduced slack is a result of participation. 
 
The influence of budget participation on budgetary slack through autonomous budget motivation 
Hypothesis 2 states that negative budget participation affects the budgetary slack through the 
motivation of autonomous budgets. The results of the study using statistical tests showed negative 
but insignificant budget participation variables through autonomous budget motivation, so 
hypotheses 2 were not accepted (H2 not accepted). The results indicated that only by actively 
participating in the budget preparation process can directly reduce the tendency of employees to 
create a budgetary slack without waiting for the high motivation of the autonomous budget that 
employees have in advance. It signifies that the role of budget participation is very high in the 
context of eliminating the tendency to create budgetary slack in the process of budgeting. 
The opportunity to engage and participate in the preparation of budgets given by the 
company to employees will be used as a means for employees to be able to set higher objectives 
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and is ultimately utilized as a means to evaluate the objectives that have been established. In 
addition, the implementation of budget participation is also used as a means of information 
exchange. Employees involved in budget participation provide the information they have in 
relation to the establishment of a budget amount to the employer, and the employer allows the 
utilization of information obtained from subordinates for better decision-making regarding the 
determination of the amount of budget required for the company.   
Autonomous motivation (autonomous motivation) can form when three basic needs of 
psychology related to individual motivation have been fulfilled, namely the need for autonomy 
(autonomy), competence (competence), and bonding (relatedness). The functional manager given 
the opportunity to participate in the budget drafting process will feel that their basic needs have 
been met, and this can foster an autonomous motivation to the manager in terms of budgets. 
Functional managers will be motivated to accept and run a budget that has been drafted and shared 
in accordance with the choice without feeling depressed or forced with a predetermined budget. 
When the functional manager feels that the three basic needs of their psychology are fulfilled 
through the process of drafting the budget target that they participate in, it can directly influence 
and increase the autonomous motivation that the functional manager has. This will increase the 
confidence of the manager functional in determining the option to accept and execute the 
operational activities of the company as it should so that the target budget that has been set together 
can be achieved well. The increased autonomous motivation of functional managers against the 
budget will be able to improve the positive performance of functional managers (Wong-On-Wing 
et al., 2010), which means that functional managers will deliver their best performance by not 
creating a slack in the value they propose as the basis of determining their accountability centre 
budget targets. The results of this study did not support the results of research conducted by 
Baerdemaeker & Bruggeman (2015) stating that budget participation can degrade the budgetary 





This research examines the role of autonomous budget motivation mediation in the influence 
of budget participation on budgetary slack. The following is the conclusion of the results of the 
statistical data analysis that has been done. Budget participation variables proved negative and 
significant to the budgetary slack. This means that the higher the budget participation rates in the 
process of budgeting, the lower the tendency in creating a budgetary slack. This results in line with 
the results of empirical research conducted by Onsi (1973), Merchant (1985) and Dunk (1993). 
Budget participation variables proved negative but not significant to budgetary slack through the 
mediation of the autonomous budget motivation variables. The results indicated that only by 
actively participating in the budget preparation process can directly reduce the tendency of 
employees to create a budgetary slack without waiting for the high motivation of the autonomous 
budget that employees have in advance. It signifies that the role of budget participation is very 
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